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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7957
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 4 KHARTOUM 3373

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, MPOL, SU
SUBJECT: ANNUAL INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE: SUDAN

REF: STATE 167901

SUMMARY: U.S. GOALS OF MAINTAINING STRONG, STABLE AND FRIENDLY SUDAN CAPABLE OF EXERTING MODERATING INFLUENCE IN ARAB AND AFRICAN TENSIONS ARE BEST SERVED BY PRESENT MODEST SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM CONSISTING OF IMET AND FMS CASH SALES AND PROBABLE COMMERCIAL SALES. SUDANESE PLANS FOR MODERNIZATION OF MILITARY FORCES FOLLOWING OUSTER OF SOVIETS ARE REASONABLE AND RESTRAINED. SPECIFIC REQUESTS HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED BY U.S. JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MILITARY SURVEY TEAM IN AUGUST 1977. FINANCING FOR ONE SQUADRON OF F-5'S AND ASSOCIATED RADAR THROUGH FMS IS EXPECTED TO BE FROM SAUDI ARABIA WHICH IS PROVIDING FUNDS FOR ALL MAJOR SUDANESE MILITARY IMPROVEMENT EXPENDITURES. EMBASSY EXPECTS TO LIMIT SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM TO LOW-PROFILE MINIMUM SIZE. END SUMMARY.

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1. OUR SECURITY ASSISTANCE RELATIONSHIP WITH SUDAN IS CENTRAL TO REALIZATION OF U.S. GOALS AND OBJECTIVES. THESE GOALS ARE TO MAINTAIN A MODERATE, FRIENDLY SUDAN AND TO HELP SUDAN DEVELOP ITS REMARKABLE ECONOMIC POTENTIAL. SUDANESE MILITARY FORCES ARE NECESSARY FOR SUDAN'S POLITICAL STABILITY AND NATIONAL INTEGRITY. THEY ALSO CONTRIBUTE TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. IN ADDITION TO ITS MILITARY/STRATEGIC

ASPECTS, U.S. MILITARY PROGRAM IS SEEN AS SINGLE MOST SIGNIFICANT EXPRESSION OF U.S. INTEREST IN AND FREINDSHIP FOR SUDAN. MILITARY PROGRAM THUS CONTRIBUTES TO ENTIRE RANGE OF POLITICAL, MILITARY AND EVEN ECONOMIC GOALS. ANY REDUCTION IN PROGRAMS ALREADY APPROVED WOULD BE READ AS POLICY SHIFT TO WEAKEN U.S.-SUDAN RELATIONS AND WOULD RUN COUNTER TO OUR OBJECTIVES NOT ONLY IN SUDAN BUT IN MIDDLE EAST/EAST AFRICA AS WELL. SPECIFIC SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES ARE TO MAINTAIN AN EFFECTIVE SUDANESE MILITARY FORCE CAPABLE OF PROVIDING INTERNAL DEFENSE, RETAIN ACCESS TO SUDAN'S PORTS, AIRFIELDS AND OVERFLIGHT RIGHTS FOR U.S. MILITARY AND COMMERCIAL PURPOSES, ESTABLISH EFFECTIVE LOGISTIC SUPPORT PROGRAM TO MEET PROJECTED DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS AND TO ENABLE SUDAN TO PARTICIPATE IN COLLECTIVE REGIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FAVORABLE TO U.S. INTERESTS. SUDANESE REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE ARE BASED ON REQUIREMENTS IDENTIFIED BY U.S. MILITARY SURVEY IN AUGUST 1977 AND THEIR OWN PERCEIVED NEEDS FOR DEFENSE AND INTERNAL SECURITY.

2. SUDAN SHARES BORDERS WITH EIGHT AFRICAN COUNTRIES AND ADDITIONALLY HAS LONG RED SEA COASTLINE. PEOPLE ARE HETEROGENEOUS GROUP OF TRIBES AND RELIGIOUS SECTS WITH LONG HISTORY OF FACTIONAL QUARRELS. PROLONGED CIVIL WAR ENDED IN 1972 WITH PEACE TREATY BETWEEN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT AND SOUTHERN REGION, BUT SOCIAL INIFICATION OF NORTH-SOUTH AND CONFIDENTIAL

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OTHER ELEMENTS OF SUDANESE SOCIETY REMAINS DIFFICULT. INTERNAL SECURITY THREATS PERSIST DESPITE RECONCILIATION AND AMNESTY CAMPAIGN OF 1977-78 WHICH FRAGMENTED OPPOSITION AND DISORGANIZED POLITICAL GROUPINGS ANTIPATHETIC TO NIMEIRI. RECONCILIATION HAS RESULTED IN RETURN TO SUDAN OR RELEASE FROM PRISON OF MOST SUBVERSIVES AND OPPOSITION FIGURES. COMMUNIST PARTY OF SUDAN REMAINS ACTIVELY DEDICATED TO OVERTHROW OF GOVERNMENT, AND IS ONLY RELATIVELY WELL-ORGANIZED THREAT AT MOMENT, BUT NATURE OF POPULATION REQUIRES CONTINUING SECURITY VIGILANCE. EXTERNAL THREAT IS PERCEIVED IN TERMS OF DOMESTIC SECURITY. LATEST SERIOUS COUP ATTEMPT, IN JULY 1976, WAS SPONSORED BY LIBYA AND ETHIOPIA, WHERE APPROXIMATELY TWO THOUSAND ARMED SUDANESE OPPOSITIONISTS ARE STILL CAMPED. WAR IN ERITREA TENDS TO INVOLVE SUDAN ACROSS UNMARKED BORDER AREAS. SUDAN SERVES AS HAVEN FOR QUARTER MILLION REFUGEES FROM ERITREA AND ETHIOPIA AND LOGISTIC CONDUIT FOR WAR MATERIAL FOR ERITREAN LIBERATION GROUPS. SUDANESE STRATEGY INTERNALLY IS RECONCILIATION AND LIBERALIZATION OF POLITICS TO DISARM AND SUBSUME POLITICAL OPPOSITION. EXTERNALLY, SUDAN PURSUES DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS IN PREFERENCE TO CONFRONTATION IN VIEW OF SUDAN'S RELATIVELY SMALL MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT, OVERWHELMING NEED FOR TOP

PRIORITY FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, AND DISBELIEF IN VALUE
OF VIOLENT SOLUTIONS. SUDANESE FOREIGN POLICY FAVORS
REGIONAL ASSOCIATIONS SUCH AS THE OAU, ARAB LEAGUE AND UN.

3. EMBASSY KHARTOUM CONCURS WITH SUDANESE EVALUATION OF
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL THREAT. GRATEST THREAT AT MOMENT
TO STABILITY AND MODERATION IS ECONOMIC, BUT ROLE OF
MILITARY IN SUDAN IS CRUCIAL TO CONTINUED PROGRESS TOWARDS
ECONOMIC NORMALCY. U.S. MILITARY SURVEY TEAM IN AUGUST 1977
PARTICULARLY CONCURRED IN SUDANESE DESCRIPTION OF THREAT
TO SUDAN FROM ETHIOPIA WHERE SOVIETS/CUBANS DOMINATE.

4. SUDAN ACCEPTED RECOMMENDATIONS OF MILITARY SURVEY TEAM
WHICH ANALYZED CIRCUMSTANCES AND THREAT, STUDIED FORCE IN
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BEING, AND PROPOSED RELATIVELY SMALL, MODERNIZED DEFENSE
FORCE APPROPRIATE TO LDC WITH DEVELOPMENTAL AND ECONOMIC
PRIORITIES. SUDAN SPECIFICALLY REQUIRES SOME AIR DEFENSE
CAPABILITY. PRESENT POOR MOBILITY HAS BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY
UPGRADED WITH ACQUISITION OF SIX U.S. C-130 TRANSPORT
PLANES--ALREADY HARD AT WORK WITH DEVELOPMENTAL TASKS

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FITTED INTO TRAINING SCHEDULED. PRESENT SIZE (65,000 MEN) AND STRUCTURE OF MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT WILL NOT BE CHANGED SIGNIFICANTLY BUT STRENGTH SHOULD GRADUALLY INCREASE. SOVIET-SUPPLIED EQUIPMENT WHICH HAS BEEN LEFT WITHOUT SPARES OR MAINTENANCE SINCE EARLY 1977 WILL, IN SOME INSTANCES, BE REPAIRED AND PRESSED INTO SERVICE. SUDAN HAS CONCLUDED CONTRACT WITH YUGOSLAVIA TO REFIT MIG-21 AND MI-8. SUDAN PLANS TO STRENGTHEN ITS MECHANIZED FORCE IN THIS ALREADY INFANTRY HEAVY ARMY FOR SELF-DEFENSE, INTERNAL PEACE AND COOPERATION WITH UN, OAU AND ARAB LEAGUE PEACE-KEEPING MISSIONS.

5. SUDAN'S CHOICE OF TYPE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT WAS CLEARLY CONCURRED IN BY U.S. MILITARY SURVEY TEAM WHICH REACHED SIMILAR CONCLUSIONS. U.S. INTERESTS WILL BE BEST SERVED WITH THIS TYPE OF MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT. ALTERNATIVES CONSIST ONLY IN SETTLING FOR LESS BY REDUCING SUPPORT, AND THEREIN LIES A DANGER OF SPOILING VALUE TO U.S. OF A STABLE AND MODERATE FRIEND IN CRITICAL AREA.

6. DEFENSE SPENDING IN SUDAN IS JUST SHORT OF 11 PERCENT OF
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NATIONAL BUDGET. GOVERNMENT LEADERS INCLUDING NIMEIRI FREELY DECLARE THAT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND BETTER STANDARD OF LIVING FOR SUDANESE HAVE HIGHER PRIORITY THAN ARMED FORCES. HOWEVER, NIMEIRI BELIEVES MODERNIZATION OF MILITARY FORCES WILL HAVE BENEFICIAL POLITICAL VALUE TO HIM AND REDUCE THREAT OF SUBVERSION AS WELL AS IMPROVE DETERRENT EFFECT ON NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES. MODERNIZATION OF SUDANESE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT FOLLOWING OUSTER OF SOVIET MILITARY ADVISORS IN 1977 IS TO BE FINANCED BY SAUDI ARABIA, THUS SHIELDING SUDANESE ECONOMY FROM IMPACT OF LARGE-SCALE CAPITAL INVESTMENTS ON MILITARY ITEMS.

7. NOT REQUIRED.

8. THERE IS NO MAP TO SUDAN. IMET FOR SUDAN WAS RESUMED IN 1977 AFTER INTERRUPTION OF SEVERAL YEARS. DURING FY-77 SOME 14 OFFICERS WENT TO U.S. FOR CGSC AND OTHER PROFESSIONAL COURSES IN SUCH FIELDS AS ARMOR, SPECIAL FORCES, ENGINEER, MILITARY POLICE, ETC. FY-78 PROGRAM AT \$250,000 WILL PROVIDE SIMILAR TRAINING. PROPOSED FY-79 PROGRAM WILL CONTINUE TO BE IN CONUS AND WILL BE OF SIMILAR NATURE WITH FUND PROJECTION OF UPWARDS OF \$450,000. ADDITIONAL FUNDS WILL ALLOW MORE SUDANESE OFFICERS TO ATTEND COURSES (NEED AND DEMAND IS THERE), SOME MORE EXPENSIVE AIR FORCE TRAINING CAN BE OFFERED, AS RECOMMENDED IN SURVEY TEAM REPORT, AND POLITICAL IMPORTANCE OF IMET

TRAINING CAN BE EXPLOITED MORE. PRESIDENT, MINDEFENSE AND OTHER SENIOR OFFICIALS HAVE RECEIVED IMET TRAINING AND APPRECIATED IT HIGHLY. FMS IS EXPECTED TO BE DONE MOSTLY WITH SAUDI ARABIA FINANCING. EXACT PURCHASES IN FUTURE WILL DEPEND ON SUDANGOV REVIEW OF SURVEY TEAM REPORT AND PERCEIVED NEED. FMS AND/OR COMMERCIAL PURCHASES INCLUDE ONE SQUADRON OF F-5'S, RELATED AIR DEFENSE RADARS AND SUBSTANTIAL CONFIDENTIAL

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TRAINING UNDER FMS WHICH IS INCLUDED IN C-130, F-5 AND AIR DEFENSE RADAR PACKAGES. TOTAL COST, INCLUDING SPARES, IS EXPECTED TO BE ABOUT \$320 MILLION FOR F-5'S AND RADARS. IN ADDITION, SUDAN MAY SEEK TO PURCHASE M-113 APCS AND HELICOPTERS FROM U.S. FIRMS THROUGH COMMERCIAL CHANNELS.

9. ECONOMIC IMPACT OF CAPITAL PURCHASES FOR MILITARY ITEMS WILL BE MINIMAL BECAUSE SAUDI ARABIA HAS AGREED TO FINANCE CONVERSION OF SUDANESE MILITARY FROM SOVIET TO WESTERN EQUIPMENT. TOTAL SIZE OF MILITARY FORCES WILL NOT CHANGE SIGNIFICANTLY. INDIRECT COSTS (ON-GOING OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE COSTS) WILL NOT BE GROSSLY AFFECTED SINCE EXTENSIVE NEW TECHNOLOGY OR CAPABILITY IS NOT BEING INTRODUCED. SUDANGOV HAS STATED PUBLICLY THAT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ENJOYS HIGHER PRIORITY FOR NATIONAL RESOURCES THAN MILITARY NEEDS, IF CONFLICT SHOULD ARISE. IN SUM, ECONOMIC PROBLEMS STEMMING FROM OUR SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM ARE LIMITED.

10. PROPOSED ACQUISITION BY SUDAN OF MINIMAL AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITY IS EXPECTED TO HAVE A BENEFICIAL EFFECT ON REGIONAL STABILITY. AS DESCRIBED ABOVE, INTERNAL STABILITY DEPENDS TO A GREAT EXTENT UPON COMPETENCE AND LOYALTY OF ARMED FORCES. EXTERNAL THREATS OF BORDER VIOLATIONS AND FOREIGN-SPONSORED SUBVERSION WILL BE SIMILARLY REDUCED BY IMPROVED CAPABILITIES OF SUDAN MILITARY. NEITHER F-5'S NOT C-130'S REPRESENT NEW TECHNOLOGY AND DO NOT BRING NOVEL CAPABILITIES TO THIS REGION. AT MAXIMUM PROJECTED STRENGTH, SUDANESE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT WILL STILL FALL SHORT OF LEVELS NEEDED TO SUPPORT ANY CHANGE FROM PAST PACIFIC POLICIES. DEFENSIVE NATURE OF PROJECTED IMPROVELENTS WILL NOT ENABLE SUDAN TO PARTICIPATE SIGNIFICANTLY IN WARFARE BEYOND HER BORDERS.

11. HUMAN RIGHTS IN SUDAN ARE BEING ENERGETICALLY IMPROVED
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THROUGH NIMEIRI'S RECONCILIATION AND AMNESTY CAMPAIGN WHICH BEGAN IN JULY 1977. POLITICAL PRISONERS IN SUDANESE JAILS (SOME 1,200) HAVE BEEN RELEASED. HUNDREDS AND PERHAPS THOUSANDS OF EXILES AND FUGITIVES FROM SUDANESE JUSTICE HAVE RETURNED UNDER AMNESTY. THE GOVERNMENT HAS ORGANIZED A CONTINUING EFFORT TO PROVIDE COMPENSATION, EMPLOYMENT, HOUSING AND POLITICAL REHABILITATION FOR RETURNEES AND EX-PRISONERS. REMARKABLY FREE ELECTIONS IN FEBRUARY 1978 BROUGHT EX-REBELS AND AMNESTIED OPPOSITION POLITICIANS INTO THE NATIONAL AND REGIONAL ASSEMBLIES WHERE THEY CONSTITUTE EITHER MAJORITY OR AT LEAST STRONG MINORITY. GOVERNMENT IS ENGAGED IN DIALOGUE WITH PUBLIC GROUPS SUCH AS BAR ASSOCIATION, LOOKING TOWARDS GREATER FREEDOM OF PRESS, MORE PERSONAL LIBERTY AND GREATER POLITICAL FREEDOM. IN GENERAL, SUDAN IS USTLY PROUD OF ITS RECENT HUMAN RIGHTS ACCOMPLISHMENTS. OUR SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IS DESIGNED TO SUPPORT THOSE LEADERS AND ELEMENTS OF SUDANESE SOCIETY RESPONSIBLE

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FOR THIS PRAISEWORTHY ATTITUDE AND TO ENABLE THEM TO
CONTINUE IT.

12. UNTIL MAY 1977, SUDAN WAS DEPENDENT ON SOVIET MILITARY ASSISTANCE. AT THAT TIME, CITING POLITICALLY-MOTIVATED DELAYS IN SOVIET PROVISION OF SPARE PARTS AND MAINTENANCE, SUDAN DISMISSED NINETY SOVIET MILITARY ADVISERS AND

ANNOUNCED ITS DECISION TO CONVERT TO WESTERN EQUIPMENT. THUS FAR NO OTHER SINGLE SOURCE OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE HAS BEEN PROMINENT. OUR SALE OF SIX C-130'S AND PROVISION OF ONE SQUADRON OF F-5'S (12 AIRCRAFT) WITH ASSOCIATED AIR DEFENSE RADAR MAKES US AT PRESENT THE LEADING SUPPLIER OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN MONETARY TERMS. OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES HOPE TO MAKE COMMERCIAL SALES TO SUDAN BUT TO DATE THE FRG HAS BEEN THE MAJOR SUPPLIER OF NON-LETHAL HARDWARE, I.E. TRUCKS, AND TANK TRANSPORTATION. CHINA MADE A ONE-TIME OUTRIGHT GIFT OF WEAPONS FOR 10,000 INFANTRY IN DECEMBER 1977 AS A GESTURE OF APPRECIATION FOR NIMEIRI'S REJECTION OF THE USSR BUT SINCE THAT PERIOD CHINA HAS DECLINED FURTHER AID FOR ITS OWN ECONOMIC REASONS. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE FOR SUDAN IS PRINCIPALLY FROM SAUDI ARABIA AND OTHER ARAB
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COUNTRIES. KUWAIT HAS INVESTED HEAVILY IN SUDAN. BRITAIN IS THE LARGEST OF THE WEST EUROPEAN SOURCES OF ASSISTANCE, BUT HOLLAND, GERMANY AND ITALY HAVE SIGNIFICANT PROGRAMS. YUGOSLAVIA AND EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES ALSO HAVE PROGRAMS IN SUDAN. AMERICAN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE IS NOT AT THE PRESENT AMONG THE TOP TEN OR FIFTEEN IN SIZE. IN SUM, SUDAN HAS SUCCESSFULLY OBTAINED ECONOMIC SUPPORT FROM COUNTRIES OF EVERY POSSIBLE POLITICAL HUE. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE IS NOT DIRECTLY RELATED TO SUDAN'S MILITARY MODERNIZATION AND IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM.

13. (A) LEVEL 1 (MINIMUM LEVEL). THERE IS NO MAP TO SUDAN. RELATIVELY MODEST IMET AT \$250,000 LEVEL COULD BE REDUCED OR ELIMINATED. FMS AND/OR COMMERCIAL SALES PROVIDE ONLY FOR ONE SQUADRON OF F-5'S AND ASSOCIATED AIR DEFENSE RADAR. NO FURTHER FMS SALES ARE CONTEMPLATED, ALTHOUGH STRAIGHT COMMERCIAL DEALS FOR APCs AND HELICOPTERS MAY BE REQUESTED BY SUDAN. REDUCING OR ELIMINATING IMET WOULD CAUSE DISPROPORTIONATE ADVERSE REACTION SINCE ONE OF MAJOR BENEFITS OF IMET IS FRIENDLY RELATIONSHIPS ESTABLISHED WITH GOVERNMENT LEADERS INCLUDING NIMEIRI. RENEGING OR CUTTING BACK ON FMS SALES OF F-5'S AND RELATED RADAR SYSTEMS WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT OF BASIC SHIFT IN OUR POLICY AFTER PERSUADING SUDAN TO ACCEPT JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MILITARY SURVEY TEAM RECOMMENDATIONS. IMET AND F-5 AIR DEFENSE RADAR PACKAGE ARE ONLY DIRECT SECURITY ASSISTANCE RECOMMENDED BY EMBASSY FOR SUDAN. OTHER WESTERN SUPPLIERS AND/OR COMMERCIAL SALES ARE EXPECTED TO RESPOND TO OTHER NEEDS. THUS LEVEL 1 (MINIMUM LEVEL) CLOSELY RESEMBLES LEVEL 3 (CURRENT LEVEL). JUSTIFICATION FOR CURRENT LEVEL OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE REMAINS VALID. HOWEVER, THE SUDAN PLANS TO PURSUE A COURSE OF MECHANIZING ITS INFANTRY WHICH WILL RESULT IN AN FMS OR COMMERCIAL SALE. WE CONSIDER
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THIS A VALID REQUIREMENT FOR THE SUDAN.

13 (A) LEVEL 2 (INTERMEDIATE LEVEL). THERE IS NO LOGICAL PROGRAM LEVEL INTERMEDIATE BETWEEN CURRENT LEVEL AND VIRTUAL CESSATION OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN U.S. AND SUDAN. IMET RESPONDS TO DEMAND AND NEED; INADEQUATE IMET LESS THAN PRESENT LEVELS WOULD BE MEANINGLESS IN SECURITY ASSISTANCE TERMS AND HARMFUL IN POLITICAL TERMS.

13 (C) CURRENT LEVEL:

(1) MAP - THERE IS NO MAP TO SUDAN

(2) IMET - IMET FOR SUDAN WAS RESUMED IN FY-77 AT \$100,000 LEVEL AFTER INTERRUPTION OF SEVERAL YEARS. DURING FY-77 SOME 14 OFFICERS WENT TO U.S. FOR CGSC AND OTHER PROFESSIONAL COURSES IN SUCH FIELDS AS ARMOR, SPECIAL FORCES, ENGINEER, MILITARY POLICE, ETC. FY-78 PROGRAM HAS BEEN SET UP AT \$250,000 AND SIMILAR TRAINING WILL BE PROVIDED. ALL TRAINING WILL BE IN CONUS IN FY-79 AND SIMILAR AND ADDITIONAL TRAINING WILL BE CONTINUED DUE TO PROJECTED INCREASE IN IMET TO \$450,000.

(3) FMS FINANCING - ALMOST ALL FMS PURCHASES EXPECTED TO BE FINANCED BY SAUDI ARABIA. EXACT ITEMS TO BE PURCHASED IN FY-79 WILL DEPEND ON RESULTS OF SUDANGOV PERCEPTION OF THE THREAT POSED BY ETHIOPIA AND LIBYA; ECONOMIC CONSTRAINTS AND, LASTLY, THE USG MILITARY SURVEY REPORT, 1977. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT SUDAN MILITARY ARE NOT IN FULL ACCORD WITH USG SURVEY.

(4) FMS AND/OR COMMERCIAL PURCHASES: AS WITH FMS FINANCING, SPECIFIC ITEMS WILL BE DETERMINED AFTER BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS. SUDANGOV IS REQUESTING PURCHASE OF ONE SQUADRON OF F-5'S, RELATED AIR DEFENSE RADARS AND SUBSTANTIAL TRAINING UNDER FMS. TOTAL COST, INCLUDING SPARES EXPECTED TO BE APPROX. \$320 MILLION. IN ADDITION, SUDANGOV MAY SEEK TO PURCHASE APCS AND HELICOPTERS FROM U.S. FIRMS THROUGH FMS OR COMMERCIAL CHANNELS. GIVEN LEAD TIMES AND

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OTHER PROBLEMS, IT COULD BERY WELL BE THAT MAJOR PORTION OF THESE ITEMS WILL NOT RPT NOT BE DELIVERED UNTIL FY-80. SUDAN IS EXPLORING POSSIBILITIES OF PURCHASE OF ABOUT \$5 MILLION IN FIELD ENGINEERING EQUIPMENT TO BE USED NOT ONLY FOR DEFENSE BUT ALSO FOR DEVELOPMENTAL TASKS IN KEEPING WITH PRESENT PRACTICE OF USING FIELD ENGINEERS TO BUILD BRIDGES, ETC., FOR CIVILIAN USE.

13. (D) INCREMENTAL LEVELS (OPTIONAL) WE DO NOT RECOMMEND ADDITIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE BEYOND PRESENT LEVELS. SUDAN'S NEEDS AND INTENTIONS, AS JOINTLY IDENTIFIED AFTER RECEIPT OF U.S. MILITARY SURVEY TEAM REPORT, ARE MODEST AND PRACTICAL. EMBASSY BELIEVES THAT ESSENTIAL ITEMS BEYOND ONE SQUADRON OF F-5'S, ASSOCIATED RADAR AND PERHAPS SMALL AMOUNT OF OTHER EQUIPMENT SUCH AS HELICOPTERS, APCS AND

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FIELD ENGINEER EQUIPMENT, SHOULD BE SOUGHT FROM OTHER WESTERN SOURCES. HOWEVER, MANY SUDANESE FAVOR GOING ALL THE WAY WITH US EQUIPMENT. SAUDI ARABIAN FINANCING OF MILITARY PURCHASES IS FINITE AND SERVES AS ADDITIONAL RESTRAINT ON SUDANESE PROPOSALS. MOST IMPORTANTLY, SUDAN INSISTS THAT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND SOUND FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT OF NATIONAL BUDGET BE GIVEN PRIORITY OVER ARMED FORCES PURCHASES.

13. (E) ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND RISK/BENEFIT ANALYSXS. CURRENT LEVEL OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE WILL HELP ENSURE STABLE, MODERATE AND FRIENDLY SUDAN, WILL ENABLE SUDAN TO EXERT BELEFICIAL INFLUENCE ON ARAB AND AFRICAN PROBLEMS, AND WILL PERMIT SUDANESE LEADERSHIP TO FOCUS ON DEVELOPMENT OF DOMESTIC ECONOMIC POTENTIAL, ESPECIALLY AGRICULTURAL WEALTH. AT PRESENT THERE IS NO OTHER COUNTRY IN AFRICA BETTER SUITED OR LOCATED TO COUNTERACT SOVIET/CUBAN HEGEMONY.

PRESENT LEADERSHIP OF SUDAN HAS NINE YEARS OF EXPERIENCE, HAS EVOLVED FROM LEFTIST, AUTOCRATIC STATE TO PRO-WESTERN AND INCREASINGLY HUMANE SOCIETY, AND HAS ADOPTED STRATEGY OF RECONCILIATION AMONG OTHER STATES IN THIS HOT SPOT.
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SECURITY ASSISTANCE APPEARS TO ENTAIL LITTLE RISK FOR U.S., WHILE FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE AND ENCOURAGE UNUSUALLY ADVANTAGEOUS ASPECTS OF SUDAN WOULD CONSTITUTE AT BEST A LOST OPPORTUNITY.

13. (F) EMBASSY PROPOSES DAO CONSISTING OF THREE AMERICANS, ONE LOCAL HIRE AND ONE AMERICAN CONTRACT PERSON. IN ADDITION THERE WILL BE SMALL NUMBER USG MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL STATIONED IN THE SUDAN ON A TEMPORARY BASIS SUPPORTING FMS SALES. FOR EXAMPLE, APPROXIMATELY \$90 MILLION PEACE PILLAR PROGRAM INVOLVING SALE SIX C-130 AIRCRAFT AND RELATED SPARES, TRAINING, ETC., HAS REQUIRED PRESENCE HERE OF ONE USAF MAJOR AND ONE DOD CIVILIAN ATTACHED TO EMBASSY. IN ADDITION, THERE WILL BE A MAXIMUM OF 26 LOCKHEED CONTRACT PERSONNEL. WE EXPECT OTHER PROGRAMS TO BE IMPLEMENTED IN SIMILAR MANNER WITH MAJORITY AMERICANS INVOLVED BEING COMPANY CONTRACT PERSONNEL AND ONLY RELATIVELY FEW USG PERSONNEL ATTACHED TO EMBASSY.

13. (G) NOT REQUIRED

13. (H) IMET. TRAINING WILL CONSIST OF CGSC AND OTHER PROFESSIONAL COURSES SUCH AS ARMOR, SPECIAL FORCES, ENGINEER, MILITARY POLICE, ETC. FY-78 PROGRAM HAS BEEN SET AT \$250,000. CONUS TRAINING FOR ALL SERVICES ESPECIALLY AIR FORCE AND ARMY IS AN ACROSS-THE-BOARD HIGH PRIORITY ITEM. MAJOR VALUE OF IMET TRAINING IN CONUS AND ONE OF PRINCIPAL REASONS FOR REQUEST FOR IMET FROM PRESENT SUDANESE LEADERSHIP IS APPRECIATION FOR LONG-TERM PROFESSIONAL AND POLITICAL EFFECT OF CONUS TRAINING. ADDITIONAL FMS TRAINING WHICH IS INCLUDED IN THE C-130 PROGRAM, FUTURE F-5 AND AIR DEFENSE RADAR TRAINING WILL BE CONDUCTED IN CONUS AND IN COUNTRY.
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THE GOS HAS NO CURRENT PLANS TO PURCHASE OTHER FMS TRAINING.

13. (I) AMBASSADOR'S BUDGET ESTIMATES:

	MAP	IMET	FMS FINANCING	FMS & COMMERCIAL SALES
FY-80	-0-	\$450,000	-0-	5,800,000
FY-81	-0-	\$500,000	-0-	4,700,000
FY-82	-0-	\$500,000	-0-	3,900,000

MERRICK

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: SECURITY, MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 26 jul 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978KHARTO03373
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780306-0200
Format: TEL
From: KHARTOUM
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780720/aaaaaqed.tel
Line Count: 555
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 9cf9e66c-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION PM
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 11
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 78 STATE 167901
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 29 apr 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 1885947
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: ANNUAL INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE: SUDAN
TAGS: MASS, MPOL, SU
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odhc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/9cf9e66c-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014